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Abstract 
This paper examines the role of different product information flows on the diffusion of new 
pharmaceuticals. Given the innovative nature of pharmaceutical drugs and their impact on health care 
expenditure there is a surprisingly small literature devoted to this topic. Some information flow 
mechanisms have been examined individually in the literature, but very few have captured the 
simultaneous impact of these mechanisms on up-take and diffusion. This paper uses the up-take of 
statins as an example. Diffusion of this therapeutical group is expressed as a function of four specific 
informational channels: self-experience, consumption externalities, scientific evidence and marketing. In 
addition to this, the influence of economic factors is tested to examine whether they have any role in drug 
diffusion. Prescription data from over 130 GP practices in the UK during 1991-2004 are used to test the 
econometric specification applying dynamic panel data methods. Results suggest individual self-
experience and clinical evidence are major factors promoting diffusion, while there is an inverse 
relationship with GP practice size and diffusion. Having controlled for these factors financial incentives 
and marketing appear to play little role. 
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I. Introduction  
 
There has been little examination of the processes driving the adoption and diffusion of 
new pharmaceutical drugs despite their innovative nature and the complexity of the 
pharmaceutical market structure. Only a small number of studies formally assess the 
role of information, which naturally accompanies new product launches, in this diffusion 
process. A number of studies focus on physician behaviour highlighting either learning 
through self-experience or the influence of peer-group effects, yet others on the direct 
influence of scientific evidence on the uptake process (Coscelli and Shum, 2004; 
Crawford and Shum, 2005, Bikchandani et al., 2001, Azoulay, 2002). Berndt et al. 
(2003) examined the positive impact of consumption externalities on the adoption of 
new anti-ulcer drugs using market level data, while Nair et al (2010) have considered 
the impact that peer-effects have on the slow adoption of new drugs. Ching and Ishihara 
(2010) consider the role of clinical evidence in a structural learning model based on 
individual manufacturer and physician behaviour. These analyses of pharmaceutical 
drug diffusion generally adopt an aggregate perspective based on the total volume of 
pharmaceutical sales, although the learning process models based on self-experience 
do analyse individual physician behaviour. Moreover most empirical work to date 
restricts consideration to specific, individual informational flows to explain diffusion. 
Undoubtedly this partly reflects data restrictions and the collinear movements that exist 
across a range of informational variables and their empirical proxies.  Chintagunta et al 
(2009) and Bradford and Kliet (2010) do consider the role of competing information such 
as any available public information and the doctor’s learning process obtained from 
patients’ experience.  
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This paper extends these studies of competing information flows on the diffusion of new 
medicines through an empirical analysis from the physicians’ perspective. The analysis 
covers the diffusion process from the early stages of market entry, when drugs are 
newly launched, to a later stage of diffusion in which demand is established and specific 
treatments are commonly prescribed by physicians. Four specific information channels 
are indentified: clinical evidence on the treatment, self-experience, pharmaceutical 
company marketing efforts, and consumption externalities. 
 
Existing evidence suggests a positive relationship between increased scientific evidence 
and the diffusion of pharmaceuticals as shown by Azoulay for the anti-ulcer drug market 
(2002)2. Personal experience, through prescribing, seems likewise important as product 
quality associated with efficacy and safety will be revealed through usage. Empirical 
evidence suggests that direct prescription experience does indeed impact on up-take 
(Currie and Park, 2002; Coscelli and Shum, 2004).  Company marketing efforts confer 
an additional information source. The focus in this study is on the diffusion of statins as 
a drug class therefore we are not interested in whether advertising is informative or 
manipulative, we merely note that pharmaceutical sales have been positively associated 
with advertising efforts and this effect has been shown to be positive (Azoulay, 2002; 
Berndt et al., 2003). Lastly, consumption externalities, reflecting peer group acceptance 
(or rejection) either at the market or physician practice level, also seem to affect new 
product diffusion rates. Berndt et al. (2003) provide positive empirical support on such 
market externalities, while a number of studies are suggestive of practice level 
externalities (Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Shiller, 1995). 
 
                                            
2
 Azoulay (2002) uses the stock of scientific information as proxy to study the relationship between clinical evidence in 
the sales pattern in the anti-ulcer drug market.  
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 The diffusion framework is tested with a dynamic empirical model using prescription 
data on statins within the UK primary care market. Statins are cholesterol-lowering 
drugs for the prevention and treatment of coronary heart disease and cerebrovascular 
disease3. Diffusion of this new therapy is explored at the therapeutic class level4. This is 
justified on the basis that once a new therapeutic class is introduced there is aggregate 
information acquired on the drug class5. This will always hold unless there is substantial 
within-class variation in product; which is not an issue here, as individual statin products 
all exhibit the same therapeutic (class) effects. Figure 1 shows the total number of 
prescription statins dispensed in the community in England from 1991 to 2004 outlining 
an increasing diffusion of statins beginning with slow up-take at the early stage of 
market entry and then an accelerated up-take rate over later years. Saturation, as 
normally indicated by a logistic type (S-shaped) curve, has obviously not occurred yet 
for statins and these drugs still seem to be diffusing widely across the NHS. 
 
Finally, note that although there are several individual drugs within the therapeutical 
group all were branded products during the examination period. Generic competition 
against branded statins began in 2003, when patent protection for simvastatin expired. 
In 2004, a generic product for pravastatin also started being marketed. As the generic 
market only opened in the last two years of the study period 1991-2004, branded-
                                            
3
 Heart disease and cerebrovascular disease are the first two leading causes of death not only in the UK but also 
worldwide. In 2004 statins represented around 4% of all prescriptions items dispensed in England and approximately 
10% of the overall net ingredient cost. The evidence regarding statins is incontrovertible and NICE has published 
technology appraisal promoting the use of statins to prevent cardiovascular disease (NICE, 2006). 
 
4Within the statins therapeutical group there are six different molecules. The first statin to be marketed in the UK was 
simvastatin and it was introduced in 1989. Other statins like pravastatin and fluvastatin were introduced early in the 
90s and during the second half of the 90s atorvastatin and cerivastatin emerged in the market. In 2003 rosuvastatin 
was launched, this is a year before the end of the study period however its prescription is included into the analysis as 
part of the diffusion process.  
5
 Molecules within therapeutical class share common features and informative inter-molecular spillovers are assumed 
to exist: once the first molecule within the same therapeutical group is marketed, information will spill over subsequent 
molecules. Within-class product variation is not an issue with the drug classes studied below where individual 
products all exhibit the same therapeutic class effects. 
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generic competition is discarded given that our interest lies in the overall diffusion 
patterns of statins as a therapeutical group, and these drugs are still diffusing widely.  
 
Figure 1 
 
II. Model Specification 
The up-take of these new prescription drugs is analysed within a dynamic empirical 
model. The general model specification includes the price of statins as it might be 
expected that new prescription drug demand by physicians is explained by, amongst 
other factors, drug prices. However, in the UK primary care sector there is evidence to 
suspect that general practitioner’s (GP) knowledge of drug price is poor and does not 
affect prescription rates per se6. The UK Office of Fair Trading (OFT) in an extensive 
evaluation of the UK Pharmaceutical Pricing and Reimbursement Scheme (PPRS) 
undertook an analysis of 1,000 GPs and their ability to rank branded drugs by price. 
They found no evidence consistent with GP price awareness (OFT, 2007). Given that 
we are dealing with a single therapeutic class such a finding casts doubt on the general 
influence of price on volume, which of course is also affected by co-payment levels and 
the level of compliance. Moreover there is generally little price variation after a drug is 
launched other than adjustment for inflation, in some cases even beyond patent expiry 
(Kanavos et al., 2007). Nonetheless we include price in our general specification to test 
                                            
6In the context of the UK National Health System (NHS), in which we analyse demand, it is not evident that price will 
in any case enter the demand function. Under the public health insurance system of the type existing in the UK the 
prescribing physician has little incentive to incorporate price as a factor affecting demand. On the consumer (patient) 
side, the cost borne, regardless of the actual drug price, is a relatively low, fixed co-payment and thus it is unlikely 
that demand is affected. 
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whether physicians do react to drug price in their decision to prescribe.7 Demand for 
statins, which is taken to be synonomous with diffusion, is thus given as follows: 
iititittit cdxIpq  .    (2.1)  
 The dependent variable itq  is the average prescription volume per physician in practice 
i at time t . The dependent variable is constructed as the total number of prescriptions  
in practice i in year t  divided by the number of GPs in the practice (in logarithmic terms). 
Ideally, the analysis would pursue examination of diffusion at the individual GP level. 
This was not possible due to coding issues within the data set as the prescriptions 
issued in each individual practice were mostly coded under the identifier of the “leading 
prescriber” rather than the individual GP. The number of drugs prescribed by each GP 
could therefore not be calculated and an average measure was used as a proxy for the 
number of prescriptions issued by each doctor in the practice.  The first variable in the 
right-hand side of equation 2.1 represents the price element. As we are considering the 
analysis at the therapeutical level the price is a weighted average of the drugs within the 
group. The main component in 2.1, itI , represents a matrix of variables defining product 
information flows and is expanded as follows: 
 
),,,,( 1 ttititit mcepemeqI       (2.2) 
 
1itq  is the lagged value of the dependent prescription volume variable and captures the 
physician’s own self-experience. The underlying idea is that prescriptions issued in the 
previous year yield knowledge on drug performance, primarily efficacy and safety. The 
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 Although a reduced form model is estimated endogeneity of price remains an issue and is addressed in our 
empirical specification below. 
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second element, tme , captures informational externalities relating to the general market 
acceptability of the drug. This is represented as the log of total statins sales in the 
pharmaceutical retail market. The practice information externality, ipe , represents the 
information that potentially may be derived from peers in the same practice8. It is 
measured as the count of GPs in the same practice and intends to capture whether 
number of peers in the practice will affect uptake.  
 
The fourth element in (2.2), tce , measures available scientific evidence. In order to 
capture this an index of the cumulative published clinical evidence available each year 
was constructed. As analysis is undertaken at the therapeutical group that comprises 
different individual drugs, scientific evidence was adjusted by individual contributions 
corrected by their relative weight within the drug group. This weight is proxied by the 
market share of each individual drug within the statins group. This index is therefore 
defined as the cumulative number of scientific papers published ( ktcum ) for each 
molecule within any of the drug classes weighted by their market share ( ktmshare ): 
  ki ktktt msharecumCE 1 )(    for  2004,...,1991t  
 
Where k represents each of the six molecules within the statins class. The variable 
ktcum  refers to all scientific papers published up to year t . In order to obtain the 
                                            
8
 It could be argued that externalities could also arise from information sharing among patients generating consumer 
externalities. However, as we are examining the prescription decision what matters are physician-related externalities. 
Including potential consumer externalities would introduce elements of the doctor-patient relationship that are beyond 
the scope of this paper. In any case these types of externalities are not observed by the researcher and any potential 
influence would be captured by the unobserved fixed-effect ic  shown in equation 2.1.  
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cumulative number of papers the following strategy was followed. A search was carried 
out in PubMed for papers that had any of the statins molecules in the title or abstract9. 
Following Azoulay (2002) the definition of this variable reflects the stock of clinical 
evidence as the evidence provided is expected to have long-term effects. Relevant 
publications may appear before the introduction of the product and consequently the 
variable includes clinical evidence prior to the year of entry in the market. 
 
The last of the information flow variables in (2.2), tm , reflects the marketing efforts made 
by statins manufacturers10. Published studies have generally used specific data source 
that captures detailing minutes spent by sales representatives with physicians (Berndt et 
al., 1995, 1997, 2003; Azoulay, 2002). Such data is not publicly available and was not 
accessible for this study. Thus marketing activity was proxied using information on 
employment and the size of the pharmaceutical sales force for each statin 
manufacturer. This information was retrieved from their Annual Accounts, which were 
accessed from UK Companies House which registers and provides basic information on 
all UK-operating companies. Data on manufacturers’ total employment, distribution or 
sales/marketing employment was retrieved as a basis to proxy advertising effort. This 
data is used to construct a marketing variable ( teindex ) that captures the percentage of 
                                            
9
 Azoulay (2002) labels the articles as “marketing-expanding science” to the articles that compare the drug with 
placebo and “comparative science” when they compare two or more drugs within the same group. This distinction is 
not made here as we are not examining within group patterns but the influence of clinical evidence on statins diffusion 
as a whole. Regardless of the benchmark drug, clinical articles will be informative in nature.  
10
 Note that in characterising marketing as an informative source we do not refer to the goals that marketing efforts 
may pursue. It has been discussed in the literature whether marketing has a pure information (knowledge 
dissemination) objective or it aims at ensuring prescription persistence over time. Evidence in support of both 
objectives has been empirically shown (Leffler, 1981; Hurwitz and Caves, 1988; Azoulay, 2002; Windmeijer et al., 
2006). In the context of the current model, the interest is not about the discussion regarding the final goal of 
advertising efforts but rather what is the market mechanism used to inform physicians on availability and product 
characteristics.   
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sales/distribution employment of each manufacturer as a proportion of the 
manufacturer’s total employment weighted by the market share of their product11 
  ki ktktt mshareemployeindex 1 )(%    for  2004,...,1991t  
 
where ktemploy%  is the proportion of employment force devoted to sales/distribution by 
manufacturer producing drug k  within statins therapeutical class and ktmshare  is the 
market share of drug k at period t12. Given extensive data limitations and a lack of 
publicly available data from pharmaceutical companies sales employment measures 
represent a viable proxy. 
 
The vector itx  in equation (2.1) represents confounding institutional factors defining a 
set of financial incentives, ),( iiit ddfhx  . ifh  reflects fundholding status of the GP 
practice and captures whether the practice joined the fundholding scheme in 1991. In 
the UK, between 1991 and 1999 practices could hold a budget for outpatient and 
hospital referral as well as prescribing costs. Any savings could be used to transfer the 
budget surplus from one category to another (savings in prescription costs could be 
used against any costs in specialist referral) or it could be used in the following year13. 
Incentives to prescribe new prescription drugs are thus expected to differ for those 
                                            
11
 Although each manufacturer will have a different marketing strategy, this variable only intends to account for the 
total effect of marketing on diffusion. Note that the present analysis is interested in the association between marketing 
and diffusion as a general trend for different therapeutical groups.  
12
 Whether it is specifically sales or distribution employment figures will depend upon the information provided by 
individual manufacturers in their Annual Accounts.  
13
 Studies published early after the scheme was introduced showed evidence of prescription cost containment for the 
first waves of fundholding practices (Maxwell et al., 1993; Bradlow and Coulter, 1993; Wilson et al., 1995). It was 
suggested that even though there was a general increase in prescribing costs, the growth rate was lower for the 
practices with fundholding status (Gosden and Torgerson, 1997; Delnoij and Brenner, 2000). 
 10 
practices that were fundholders. The second practice characteristic idd  relates to 
whether or not the practice was a drug dispenser. Drug dispensing practices are 
allowed to dispense prescribed drugs to patients within the practice. These are 
generally practices that are located in rural areas with no near pharmacy. Given that 
dispensing physicians have a two-tier income, salary and revenue from drugs sold, this 
variable explores whether economic incentives enhance new drug prescriptions, 
especially when new drugs have a higher unit cost than existing treatment options.  
 
Finally, specification (2.1) also includes a vector of controls itd  for various 
characteristics of the regional health authority where the practice is located: percentage 
of population aged 45-64 and older than 65 and number of GPs in the regional health 
authority. The final component ic  captures systematic unobserved heterogeneity of the 
average physician in practice i .  
 
III. Data and Panel Data Methods 
The primary data used for the empirical analysis was obtained from Intercontinental 
Medical Statistics (IMS Health). Data was retrieved from their database IMS Disease-
Analyzer containing prescription data from a sample of over 130 GP practices 
throughout the UK during the period 1991-200414. Each observation recorded is a 
patient visit in one of the participating GP practices in which a statin was prescribed. 
Price data was also obtained from IMS Health. It contains quarterly price data for the 
period 1991-2002. Prices refer to the average price of all products within the therapeutic 
                                            
14
 These practices were selected to be representative of the GPs distribution in the UK. The demographics (age and 
gender) of the patients covered by the panel of doctors in Disease-Analyzer are similar to UK population 
demographics when figures are compared to the census population from the Office of National Statistics (ONS). 
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group15. Sales data were also provided by IMS Health and refer to wholesaler and 
manufacturer distribution to retail pharmacy and dispensing doctors16. This data was 
supplemented by basic GP organisational and demographic data taken from the Office 
for National Statistics. Table 1 summarises these variables and summary statistics. 
Table 1 
The learning process held to influence diffusion discussed above is well suited to a 
dynamic panel data approach. Given that past prescription experience is used as 
explanatory variable the selection of an autoregressive-distributed lag model to estimate 
the coefficients of the variables seems appropriate. Using an AR(1) structure the model 
can be expressed as follows   
itiitittit eczqpq    1. ;   Ni ,...,2,1 ;  Tt ,...,2   
where itq  is the series for cross-section i  at time period t  with tp  the weighted real 
therapeutic price variable and 1itq  is the lagged value of the dependent variable. In 
addition to the self-learning effect captured by the lag of the dependent variable, vector 
itz  includes all the other informational, organisational and control variables in equation 
(2.1), i.e. itI , itx  and itd . The idiosyncratic term is ite  and ic  denotes unobservable 
practice-specific effects capturing heterogeneity across GP practices.  
 
                                            
15 Note that the available price data covers a shorter period than the prescription data, thus when obtaining estimates 
of demand equations with prices the study period will be restricted by the price data availability. 
16
 Price series and sales were deflated using the CPI. 
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In order to obtain consistent estimators first-differences are taken to eliminate ic  and 
remove any bias caused by the correlation of ic  and the lagged dependent variable. So 
the estimating equation becomes: 
ititittit ezqpq    1.      Ni ,...,2,1 ;     Tt ,...,3  
where  1 ititit qqq , 1 ititit zzz  and 1 ititit eee . As the first difference of the 
lagged dependent variable is now correlated with the first-differenced error component, 
instrumental variable (IV) estimators must be used in order to obtain consistent 
estimates. If 3T , there are a number of valid instruments that can be used to 
consistently estimate equation coefficients with a General Methods of Moments (GMM) 
estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Blundell and Bond, 1998; Bond, 2002). Here we 
use a vector of the levels of prescribing quantities, and where appropriate price, sales 
and marketing data across different time periods (up to T-2) as instruments for the first-
differenced equations. Due to the highly persistent prescription series, the preferred 
estimation method is the “system GMM” estimator, as the first-differences GMM 
estimator has been found to have poor finite sample properties when the lagged levels 
are weakly correlated with the first differences (Blundell and Bond, 1988). 
 
IV. Results 
All results refer to the estimates obtained using system GMM assuming endogeneity of 
the price variables, sales and marketing efforts. The prescription volume series, itq , are 
found to be persistent but unit root tests rejected stationarity. The persistence of the 
series supports use of the system GMM estimators, combining equations in differences 
and levels for estimation. The first column in Table 2 presents the results when price (in 
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logarithms) is included17. Note that these results refer 1991-2002, the time frame for 
which price data was available. The instruments used are the following 
),...,,;,...,,;,...,,;,...,,( 13,213,213,2,13,2, mmmmememeqqqppp tittitititiititi   for the equations in 
differences and ),,;( 111,1,   tttiti mmeqp  for the equations in levels18. The vector of 
instruments is adjusted according to the variables included in the various specifications. 
 
Results reported in column 1 Table 2 show the price elasticity to be negative but not 
statistically significant, and is therefore consistent with the OFT (2007) findings of no 
evidence of price responsiveness in the demand for new drugs by GPs in the UK. 
Ceteris paribus new drug prescription would not necessarily be driven by prices, as it is 
the price effect on marginal treatment cost that would matter. Given the lack of 
significance of price elasticity in statin prescription, the lack of influence of price on 
diffusion and the potential simultaneity across price and volume defined variables 
attention is now given to the diffusion equations that exclude prices. Note however that 
the coefficients on the variables reflecting self-experience and practice externalities, 
which we return to below, are significant and consistent across all specifications. 
 
Interestingly, although practices that are fund-holders and drug-dispensers are expected 
to have a faster up-take of statins there is no significant estimated impact and this result 
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 Alternative specifications with one and two lags of the dependent variable (Pres(t-1) and Pres(t-2)) and sales 
(Sales and Sales(t-1)) were also considered to explore alternative dynamic specifications but to no great effect.    
18
 A large number of instruments included in the estimation may lead to a problem of weak instruments and the 
Sargan test of the validity of additional moment conditions may not be reliable. In the results presented, all possible 
instruments were included. However, we also run the model using five lags as instruments. Results did not change 
and the Sargan test confirmed the validity of the additional moment conditions used in the estimation procedure.  
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is robust across all the specifications presented19. Therefore, there is no evidence from 
our data that organisational factors influence diffusion20. One could potentially pursue 
between and within GP practice differences, but the use of dynamic longitudinal models 
allows the control for unobservable heterogeneity. Consequently, other managerial 
attitudes that cannot be measured are captured by the unobserved practice-specific 
effect ic , and are not further pursued here.  
Table 2 
                          
Column 2 in Table 2 shows the results for the estimation of the diffusion equation for the 
period 1991-2004 without the price variable. Overall, the results suggest that self-
experience from direct prescription and cumulative clinical evidence have a positive 
impact on the up-take and diffusion of pharmaceutical drugs, while the number of GPs 
within a practice appears negatively related to up-take and diffusion.  
 
The estimate that refers to self-learning through prescribing indicates a strongly 
significant and positive impact of past experience on current new drug up-take for 
statins. The logarithmic specification of the functional form makes it possible to interpret 
the coefficient as an elasticity, therefore implying that diffusion has an elasticity of 0.63 
                                            
19
 The fundholding and drug dispensing practice characteristics present the peculiarity that are both constant over 
time. The prescription data collected by IMS Disease-Analyzer recorded at the beginning of the data collection 
whether the practice was classified as fundholder and/or drug dispenser; however, this information was not updated 
in the subsequent years. Although practices might have changed status, these characteristics indicate the managerial 
attitude that the practice might have. In the case of fundholding, in 1999 all GP practices were required to join into 
Primary Care Groups (PCGs) but this change can be considered to happen in a mature stage where the efficacy of 
the prescription drugs was better known.  
 
20
 A further possibility was inspected to detect whether the interaction of these two effects may be strong enough to 
show a significant result that could support the hypothesis of organisational factors. This might indicate that in these 
cases the combination of having a budget could be counterbalanced by the additional set of incentives that can be 
derived from having extra revenue arising from selling the drug in-site. Results could not support the effect of the 
interaction of these two factors and thus corroborates the lack of influence of the managerial strategy that defined the 
activity of each practice.   
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with respect to self-experience. We also find that accumulated scientific evidence also 
has a strongly significant positive impact on statins diffusion. The number of GPs within 
a practice appears to be negatively related to diffusion. Whilst initially surprising, having 
controlled for other factors, this negative impact might reflect greater efficiency in 
practice externalities, with smaller practices leading to easier flow of information across 
GPs within the practice reinforcing the self-learning product information flow. 
Conversely, it might reflect that larger GP practices have tighter controls over up-take. In 
this specification marketing efforts also have a pronounced effect on diffusion. 
 
The estimate for sales retains statistical significance but the sign of its coefficient 
changes. This counter-intuitive negative sign on sales is possibly reflecting 
contamination with the now excluded price variable. Consequently, a further estimation 
also excludes this variable to consider the stability of the independent effect of the other 
covariates. These results are reported in column 3 in Table 2. All other variables of 
interest remain stable apart from the marketing variable, which now becomes 
insignificant. All other variables reflecting informational flows retain their sign with self-
experience and cumulative clinical evidence on statins having a positive impact on up-
take and diffusion, and GP practice size again being negatively associated with 
diffusion. All institutional variables remain insignificant. 
 
While the four informational channels are clearly conceptually different there is apparent 
statistical overlap. While the paper is attempting to disentangle the different impacts of 
these informational flows on diffusion, estimation of an integrated dynamic model 
becomes difficult given the implied multicollinearity between some of the individual 
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proxies for our informational flows. Price and sales levels are obviously collinear; sales 
is then seemingly contaminated in regression runs where the price variable is excluded. 
When the variable sales is dropped, the marketing variable becomes affected, 
presumably through the causal relationship which will exist between sales and 
marketing21. Consequently, and as a robustness check on the other variables, the 
marketing variable is dropped from the specification shown by the final column of Table 
2. The remaining sub-set of information flow variables appears stable and consistent; 
their coefficients and significance appear robust to the dropping of these other variables.  
 
Note that for the results presented in this section, specification tests support the 
empirical model. As Arellano and Bond (1991) argue the consistency of the estimators 
depends on the lack of second-order serially uncorrelated error terms. Tests on first- 
and second-order autocorrelation indicated that we could not rule out the presence of 
first-order autocorrelation but the presence of second-order autocorrelation was rejected 
at 1% significance level. In addition, the validity of the additional moment conditions 
imposed by the instruments used to control for the presence of AR(1) and endogenous 
variables is also tested. The Hansen/Sargan test accepts the validity of the 
overidentifying restrictions. The results presented are one-step robust estimates given 
that two-step estimators have been shown to bring little efficiency gains and the trade-
off that using a two-step matrix weight brings in terms of asymptotics (Bond, 2002). 
 
As discussed above the marketing variable does not reflect product-specific marketing 
efforts or the manufacturer’s firm size. In constructing a composite index with the intent 
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 The contamination between these two variables is further confirmed by the fact that the same specification as in 
column 3 but excluding sales instead of marketing gives an insignificant and negative coefficient of the variable sales.  
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of capturing marketing effort for the whole therapeutical class it may be that we are 
averaging out marketing effort. In an attempt to further investigate the impact of 
marketing, given the data restrictions imposed on both the overall data set as noted 
above, we pursued further estimation using two additional proxies of pharmaceutical 
company marketing effort 22 . We first consider a variable that reflects the marketing 
effort by the manufacturer of the initial statin introduced onto the market, simvastatin. 
Being the first entrant brings clear potential long-term benefits to advertising. The first 
mover faces initial entry barriers, but may also capture brand loyalty in subsequent 
periods. The underlying idea here is that the initial marketing activity of the first product 
may be an important indicator of the impact of marketing more generally but will be less 
correlated with general therapeutic sales levels as it is product-specific. To further test 
this idea we also examine the marketing effort of the fourth statin to be introduced, 
atorvastatin. This specific product has come to be seen as the most direct competitor of 
the initial statin, given its therapeutic advantage, on the market and again, while the 
product specific marketing is held to be less correlated with the sales variable, it may 
also reflect the role of marketing generally in the diffusion process. Both of these 
alternative proxies were again measured by the proportion of employees in the 
sales/distribution department using data from the Companies House as detailed above. 
Results are presented in Table 3 and the sales variable is excluded to control for 
contamination between sales and marketing.  
Table 3 
 
                                            
22
 This measurement difficulty is not aided by a general reluctance of the industry to release product specific 
marketing data due to commercial sensitivities. 
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As can be seen from the results of Table 3 these additional proxies did not introduce 
any further insight. Both proxies indicate a positive impact on diffusion but the effect is 
not significant. The variables on self-experience and GP size remain significant and 
robust when compared to earlier results. The clinical evidence variable remains 
relatively robust, although it becomes insignificant when the marketing levels of the first 
entrant are proxied.  
 
V. Concluding Remarks 
The results obtained suggests that prices are not an important driving force in the 
diffusion of statins within the UK, in line with the most recent evidence provided by the 
OFT (2007) on the lack of drug price awareness by GPs. The evidence provided with 
respect to financial incentives given to GPs as measured by the fund-holding and drug-
dispensing status is also in line a finding of no relationship between volume and prices. 
The results robustly suggest that self-experience through prescribing plays an important 
role. This is a result consistent with the characterisation of drugs as experience goods 
and with physicians acquiring knowledge about the product safety and efficacy through 
drug prescription. Cumulative clinical evidence is also found to play a significant and 
independent role in aiding statins diffuse across the health sector.  The size of the GP 
practice appears to be inversely related with diffusion. This aspect warrants further 
investigation in order to determine exactly the explanation behind this negative causal 
relation, although it is consistent with GP practice externalities being more efficient 
when GP numbers are small.  
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Careful interpretation is required given the proxies used for marketing efforts. In 
considering the various specifications the impact of marketing effort is generally in the 
presumed a priori direction and diffusion does appear to be augmented by 
pharmaceutical company marketing, although the relationship could not be statistically 
fully supported. The estimates for marketing activity were highly conditioned on the 
variable measurement and the proxy used to capture advertising. Despite the fact that 
we did not hold accurate marketing data, proxies were included to control for this 
influence.  Improved marketing data, which is undoubtedly collected but of high 
commercial value, would be most useful in investigating this impact further. 
Conceptually diffusion could also be explained by general market consumption 
externalities, although empirically this could not be statistically determined as the 
variable used as proxy (sales) appeared to be contaminated by others covariates; 
specifically price and marketing.   
      
The data available for this paper were specific to the statins therapeutical class, being a 
new drug class with a highly innovative therapeutical contribution. However, analysis of 
diffusion of other new therapeutical classes ought to be pursued to improve the results 
reported here. Other drug classes would present different characteristics that could lead 
to dynamics that shape diffusion differently. Also the data used here had the limitation 
that individual prescription patterns could not be observed because prescriptions were 
generally tagged under the leading prescriber in the practice. The analysis therefore had 
to be focused on the prescription pattern of the GP practice instead. Ideally, additional 
research would examine the prescription patterns of individual physicians. This could 
possibly be analysed using survey data on prescriptions, but would have the limitation of 
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short period of observational data, something that our dataset overcomes as there are 
fourteen years of data.  
 
This research used a dynamic model to simultaneously test various influences on 
pharmaceutical diffusion within the UK GP sector. However, empirically there were data 
limitations that could not provide full robust evidence on some of the individual 
informational aspects. This was an ambitious aim given the inherent complexities of the 
diffusion process and the lack of primary data. The data restrictions reflect the indicative 
nature of our results, although it is clear that independent influences are at work in the 
diffusion process. Thus, further work on this area is necessary to confirm the 
determinants of the diffusion of health care technology generally and pharmaceuticals 
specifically, before full understanding can be given to the process of diffusion in this 
area. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
Variable Description Mean Std. Err. 
Pres Average Prescription per physician (logs) 2.25 0.047 
Sales Market externalities proxied by market sales (logs) 18.90 0.031 
NGP Practice externalities (number of GPs in practice) 5.13 0.053 
Ce Clinical Evidence  806.19 10.14 
Mkt Marketing efforts  0.487 0.001 
Fh Fund-holding (=1 if practice is fundholder) 1.48 0.012 
Dd Drug dispensing (=1 if drug dispenser) 0.20 0.010 
GPs General Practitioners by regional health authority  2459 20.98 
Pop45_64 Percentage population aged 45-64 by regional health authority  0.23 0.0005 
Pop65 Percentage population aged 65 and above by 
regional health authority  0.16 0.0004 
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Table 2. Diffusion Equations 
Dep. Variable: 
Pres(t)  (1) All (2) No Price 
(3) No price 
and no sales  
(4) No price, no 
sales, no  Mkt 
Price -2.310596    
Pres(t-1) 0.624707*** 0.636175*** 0.636175*** 0.611009*** 
Sales 0.431009 -0.557860*   
NGP -0.026837** -0.027890** -0.027890** -0.029758** 
Ce -0.000228 0.001051*** 0.000295** 0.000538*** 
Mkt  0.645699 0.728427** -0.547026  
Fh 0.005221 0.01735 0.01735 0.017041 
Dd 0.087716 0.093058 0.093058 0.100084 
GPs -0.000053 -0.000046 -0.000046 -0.00005 
Pop45_64 -1.77288 -1.15118 -1.15118 -1.215463 
Pop65 1.31778 1.002882 1.002882 1.062023 
Time Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
N 1334 1594 1594 1594 
m1 0 0 0 0.001 
m2 0.069 0.04 0.04 0.04 
Hansen/Sargan  0.74 0.998 0.998 0.239 
                             
            Notes:  Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
                                                 m1 and m2 are the first and second order serial correlation tests 
                         p-value reported for the Hansen/Sargan test             
                      GMM results are one-step robust estimates 
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Table 3. Diffusion equations with marketing proxied by 
advertising efforts by first and fourth entrant. 
Dep. Variable: Pres(t)  (1) No sales/1st 
entrant  
(2) No Sales/4th 
entrant 
   
Pres(t-1) 0.636175*** 0.643720*** 
Sales   
NGP -0.027890** -0.027414** 
Ce 0.000183 0.000404*** 
Mkt 1st/ 4th entrant 1.102233 2.222887 
Fh 0.01735 0.016682 
Dd 0.093058 0.091575 
GPs -0.000046 -0.000046* 
Pop45_64 -1.15118 -1.214521 
Pop65 1.002882 1.085545 
Time Dummies Yes Yes 
N 1594 1594 
m1 0 0.001 
m2 0.04 0.039 
Hansen/Sargan 0.997 0.553 
Note: see legend in Table 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
